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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LYMAN S. SHREEVE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14,410 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and damages result-
ing from an automobile collision at an intersection in Provo, 
Utah. Appellant claims that the defendant was negligent in the 
operation of his car and that his negligence caused the accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The issue of defendant's negligence was tried to an eight 
member jury on November 17 and 18, 1975. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
awarding plaintiff $2,000.00 in general damages and nothing in 
special damages. Plaintiff subsequently made a motion for a new 
trial on the ground that the jury av/arded inadequate damages ap-
pearing to have been given under the influence of passion and 
prejudice and that the Court erred in law for failing to give 
certain requested jury instructions. The Court denied plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial and the plaintiff appeals the denial of 
the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Court declare that the award 
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was inadequate as a matter of law and to have the case remanded 
to the lower court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS { 
On December 5, 1971, an accident occurred at the intersec-
tion of 3230 North and 650 East in Provo, Utah. (Tr. 13, P. Ex. 
1, 2, 3, 6) The plaintiff, Barbara Smith, who, at that time was 
unmarried and was known as Barbara Mortenson, was driving with 
a passenger, Pauline Smith, in an easterly direction on 3230 
North. The defendant, Lyman Shreeve, and his wife were proceed-
ing south on 650 East. (Tr. 167) Plaintiff was driving a Ford 
Falcon station wagon and defendant was driving a Chrysler New 
Yorker. The weather was clear but the roads were icy and snow-
packed due to a recent snowfall. However, the easterly lane on 
650 East was more heavily traveled and was fairly clear of snow. 
i 
(Tr. 37,167, P. Ex. 1, 2, 3) The appellant entered the intersec-
tion with the intention of turning north on 650 East. As the 
appellant entered the intersection and began her turn, she saw 
i 
the defendant's vehicle approaching her from the north. (Tr. 122) 
The vehicles collided, the point of impact being somewhere be-
tween 19 and.30 feet north of what would be the imaginary exten-
< 
sion of the north line of the intersection and 2 0 feet east of 
the curb, so that the impact occurred in the northbound or east 
lane of traffic on 650 East. (Tr. 16, 18, 21-22, 30-31, 42, 45; 
P. Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4; D. Ex. 11, 12) The plaintiff's vehicle was 
struck just about at the door jamb and the impact knocked the 
left-hand door off and knocked the vehicle backwards so the ve-
hicle was resting in a ditch on the eastern edge of the road. 
(2P- Ex. 3) The Shreeve vehicle swung around and was sitting al-
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most crossways in the road. (P. Ex. 1, 2, 3) The plaintiff re-
ceived cuts on the side of her face and a cut on her chin. She 
also suffered a severe permanent injury to her left knee. 
Barbara Smith subsequently filed this action, claiming that 
the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle; 
claiming general damages in the amount of $50,000.00, special 
damages in the amount of $1,731.00 and additional special dam-
ages incurred to the close of trial. 
The case was tried to a jury on November 17 and 18, 1975. 
While the jury was deliberating the case, they sent a hand-writ-
ten note to the trial judge which stated substantially as follows: 
We find that both parties were contributor-
ily negligent but may we award punitive damages 
to the plaintiff? 
The note was discussed in chambers with counsel after which 
the Court wrote on the bottom of the note as follows: 
No. See Instructions Nos. 4 and 5. 
The note was then returned to the jury by the ballif and 
thereafter the jury returned its verdict. The handwritten note 
was never returned by the jury and was either lost or destroyed 
and no transcript was made of it. (R. 4 and 4a) Thereafter, 
the jury returned the following verdict: 
We the jury impaneled in the above-en-
titled cause find the issues in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant and assess 
the damages of the plaintiff as follows: 
General Damages: $2,000.00 
Special Damages: $ 
(Record 31) 
Immediately after rendering their verdict, the judge dismiss-
ed the jury and the jury left the courtroom. (Tr. 254) The Court 
then asked counsel if they had anything further. Counsel for 
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plaintiff questioned the validity of a verdict in which there 
were general damages but no special damages awarded, (Tr. 2 55) 
After some discussion, the Court concluded the case and recess-
ed. (Tr. 255) Shortly thereafter, counsel for plaintiff filed 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, alleging that there were inadequate damages 
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice and that the Court erred ir law for failing to give re-
quested jury instructions. (R. 22) Thereafter, the trial court 
denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial or for an additur. (R. 
19) From the denial of the motion for a new trial, this plaintiff 
appeals. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT1S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. -
Appellant made a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59(a) (5) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
59(a)(5),(7) states as follows: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes:. . . 
* * * 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, ap-
pearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice... 
* * * 
(7) Error in law. 
Appellant submits it is clear that the jury verdict in the 
present case was given under the influence of prejudice or mis-
understanding. The facts surrounding the rendering of the ver-
dict and the inadequacy of the verdict show a disregard by the 
jury of the evidence and of the instructions of the Court as to 
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the law applicable to the case and, consequently, the verdict was 
rendered under disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or in-
fluence of passion or prejudice. It is certainly clear from the 
evidence in the case and the verdict that the jury did not know 
what it was doing in awarding damages and simply failed to do 
its duty. 
It has generally been held that where a jury's verdict was 
rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice, a new trial should 
be granted under Rule 59(a)(5)% 
Rule 59(a)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, provides that a new trial may be granted 
on grounds of excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice. It is not enough, 
.under this rule nor under the code provision 
which it supplanted, merely to allege that the 
amount itself is excessive. The amount of the 
- v e r d i c t is ordinarily a matter exclusively for 
the jury and on the ground of adequacy of the 
verdict alone, the court may not interfere with 
the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears that 
the award was rendered under misunderstanding or 
prejudice. If inadequacy or excessiveness of 
the verdict presents a situation that such inade-
quacy or excessiveness shows a disregard by the 
jury of the evidence or the instructions of the 
court as to the law applicable to the case as to 
satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered 
. « * I n i l - - . . . . . . • , • - - . . , 
under such disregard or misapprehension of the 
evidence or influence of passion or prejudice, 
then the court may exercise its discretion in the 
interest of justice and grant a new trial. Sal-
tas v. Affleet, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176; Wal-
kenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654; 
Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 
P.2d 865. Therefore, in reviewing the trial 
court's ruling denying defendant's motion for 
new trial on grounds of excessiveness of damages 
awarded by the jury's verdict, this court is 
limited to a determination of whether such a rul-
ing was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme 
Court is slow to interfere with a trial court's 
ruling granting or refusing a new trial on 
questions relating to damages. Hirabelli v. 
Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172; Chatelain v. 
Thackeray, 98 Utah 5 25, 100 P.2d 191. The ques-
tion here on appeal, then, is a determination of 
-5-
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whether the damages awarded bear no proper rela-
tion to the wrong suffered as shown by the evi-
dence and in accordance with the instructions of 
the court so that this court may exercise its 
power to set aside the verdict of the jury, 
(emphasis added) Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 
1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 (1553). — 
See also Stamp v. Union Pacific R.R. Co,, 5 Utah 2d 397, 
303 P.2d 279 (1956); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 
701 (1961). It is obvious that the proper remedy under Rule 
59(a)(5) when the verdict is based upon misunderstanding or pre-
judice is to remand the case for a new trial. See Stamp v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., supra. 
Appellant proved special damages at trial in the amount of 
$1,737.75 and loss of wages in the sum of $4,916.40. (P. Ex. 17, 
Tr. 136-137) The failure of the jury to award the appellant any-
thing for her special damages shows that the jury clearly misun-
derstood its duty. Although the evidence of special damages 
was entered at the trial, the jury disregarded the proof of 
special damages in arriving at its verdict. Anytime a plaintiff 
proves his damages, he is entitled to be compensated for the dam-
ages shown. 
As to the amount of damages, the evidence 
was conflicting and if some damages, though 
only nominal, had been awarded plaintiff by 
the trial court, it would not be within our 
power to interfere. However, as some damage 
was unquestionably shown, the court's finding 
on that issue had no evidence whatever to sup-
port it and was against all the evidence. 
Stringfellow v. Bottorill Auto Co., 63 Utah 
56 , 221 P. 861 (1923). 
The amount of damages is largely within 
the jury's discretion. However, they must 
award something for every element of damage 
resulting from an injury. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Company v. Dean, 117 S.W.2d 357 (1967). 
-6-
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It is logical to conclude that the jury's 
award resulted from the jurors1 misapprehending 
their duty or compromising the question of plain-
tiff-driver fs liability. Whatever impelled the 
return of the verdict of $8000, the award is for 
less than the plaintiff's undisputed special dam-
ages and obviously is not commensurate with his 
injury and bears no reasonable relationship to 
his loss. It is apparent the damages awarded 
were inadequate under all of the prevailing tests 
for adequacy, and therefore, the trial court err-
ed in overruling plaintiffs1 motion for a new 
trial. Such error necessitates reversal. House-
holder v. Town of Clayton, 221-N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 
1974) 
The failure of the jury to award plaintiff any amount for 
special damages proved indicates that the verdict was rendered . 
under prejudice or misunderstanding and appellant is entitled to 
a new trial. 
Appellant is aware of the cases holding that any irregular-
ity in a verdict is v/aived by not asking that it be corrected be-
fore the jury is discharged. Gohen v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 37 
P.2d 306 (Utah 1975); Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 
26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1121 (1971); Lish v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 27 Utah 2d 90, 493 P.2d 611 (1972). Appellant submits, how-
ever, that the rule enunciated in those cases is inapplicable in 
the present case. 
The rule of waiver for failure to object does not apply in 
a case where the motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5). This 
distinction was explained in Langton v. International Transport, 
Inc., supra, at 1215, as follows: 
In the instant case, plaintiff may not 
properly invoke Rule 59(a) (5), U.R.C.P., as 
a ground for a new trial. There is a basic 
distinction between an insufficient or infor-
mal verdict and a verdict regular on its face, 
which awards inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under .the influence of passion 
or prejudice. Rule 59 (a*) (5). In the latter 
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case, a new trial must be granted to correct 
the error. In the former case, counsel has 
an opportunity to assert an objection, and the 
court, under Rule 47(r) , U.R.C.P., may return 
the jury for further deliberation and with fur-
ther instruction to correct the irregularity. 
If cousel does not avail himself of this op-
portunity, his objection to the irregularity 
of the verdict is waived', (emphasis added) 
That a new trial must be granted to correct error under Rule 
59(a)(5) is logical since the basis for the motion under Rule 
59(a)(5) is that the verdict was the result of the influence of 
passion or prejudice. It woul$ be meaningless to require the 
jury to return for further jury deliberation under Rule 47 (r) 
if the jury had rendered its verdict because of passion or preju-
dice. There is no reason to believe that the jury would become 
less passionate or less prejudiced by merely returning and delib-
erating further. 
Additionally, appellant asserts that even if the rule of 
waiver for failure to object did apply to Rule- 59(a)(5), that the 
failure to object would not bar granting of a new trial in the 
present case because the plaintiff had no opportunity to object 
to the verdict before the jury was dismissed. The following con-
versation took place at the time the verdict was read: 
THE COURT: It will be the order of the 
court that the judgment be entered pursuant 
to the verdict of the jury. -
Thank you for your services. You will be 
notified when to come again. It won't be 
9:30 in the morning I understand. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
(Whereupon, the jury left the courtroom.) 
. THE COURT: Do you gentlemen have anything? 
MR. WEST: The only question I have, Your 
Honor, is the question that came out and went 
back to the jury. Is that part of the record? 
-8-
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THE COURT: I don't know whether it is or 
not. 
THE BALLIF: The jury didnft return it to 
me when I picked up the pad. The jury still 
has it as far as I know. It wasnft on the pad 
when I picked up the pad, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We know what it was anyway. 
MR. WEST: Well, all right. I am wonder-
ing if some record ought to be made of what 
that question was and the answer that went back. 
THE COURT: Without having the written rec-
ord I can't be sure that I would state it correct-
ly — without having the written statement. 
MR. LEWIS: Did I understand the verdict cor-
rectly to read that was general and no special? 
THE COURT: No specials. 
MR. LEWIS: Two thousand dollars? . 
THE COURT: If it were all specials and 
no generals there would be an objection over 
here. If it were all specials and no generals 
you would object because they can't give a 
special verdict without•* a general, can they? 
Very well. 
MR. WEST: Well — 
MR. LEWIS: I haven't seen a general with-
out a special either. 
THE COURT: That would conclude the case 
as far as we are concerned tonight. The court 
will be in recess. 
(The court was ordered in recess.) 
—00O00--
(Tr. 254-255) 
As can be seen by the above dialogue, counsel for the plain-
tiff had no opportunity to object to the verdict before the jury 
had been dismissed by the Court. The Court asked counsel if they 
had anything further only after the jury had been dismissed. 
Further, the above dialogue shows that counsel for plaintiff had 
-9-
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an opportunity to carefully examine the verdict only after the 
jury had left the courtroom* Under such circumstances, it would 
have been entirely improper for the Court to recall the jury to 
the courtroom and then reinstruct them and send them back to the 
courtroom. Consequently, appellant's only alternative was to ask 
for a new trial or for an additur adding the amount of special 
damage proved. 
It is appellant's position that under Rule 59(a)(5) appellant 
is entitled to an order, remanding the case to the lower court for t 
a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
Appellantfs requested instruction no. 2 read as follows: 
You are instructed that the defendant 
was negligent as a matter of law. 
It is appellant's position that the respondent was negligent 
as a matter of law for failure to yield the right-of-way at an 
intersection and for driving in the wrong lane within 100 feet 
of an intersection, and that the Court erred in refusing to give 
appellant's requested instruction no. 2, In the alternative, the 
appellant asserts that respondent was negligent as a matter of law 
for driving in the wrong lane and the question of respondent's 
negligence was not a question of fact for the jury and, there-
fore, the Court erred in failing to give instruction no. 2. 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-72 (a) governs right of way at 
uncontrolled intersections. That section states as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection shall yield the right of way to 
-10-
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a vehicle which has entered the intersection 
from a different highway* 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-58 prohibits the driving on the 
left side of a roadway within a hundred feet of an intersection. 
That section states as follows: 
(a) No vehicle shall at any time be 
driven to the left side of the roadway under 
the following conditions: 
• • • 
(2) when approaching within one hundred 
feet of or traversing any intersection, rail-
road grade crossing. 
• •••'••• 
In the present case it is clear that the defendant violated 
both of the above-cited statutes. The defendant failed to yield 
the right-of-way to the plaintiff as he approached the intersec-
tion (Tr. 169, 181, 183) and, in addition, the defendant, as 
shown by the point of impact (Tr. 18, 42, 45; P. Ex. 6), was driv-
ing in the lefthand lane within one hundred feet of an intersection, 
Appellant submits that such violation of the statutes constitutes 
negligence as a matter of law and the Court erred in failing to so 
instruct the jury. 
The Utah court has held in several cases that the violation 
of a standard of safety set by statute can, under certain circuits 
stances, constitute negligence as a matter of law. In Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964), this Court 
discussed at length the cases concerning violation of statutes 
and whether the violation constituted negligence per se or negli-
gence as a matter of law. The Court stated as follows: 
We are aware that it has sometimes been 
•.- stated as a general rule that violation of a 
statutory standard of care is negligence as a 
matter of law. This is indeed a sound rule, 
but like all generalities, it has its limita-
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tions and is applicable only under proper cir-
cumstances. The court has previously had oc-
casion to consider this problem and to point 
out the distinction between applying this rule 
where the circumstances justify it and where 
they do not. 
Although the court in Thompson held that the defendant v/as 
not negligent as a matter of law, it did so because it said that 
the defendant's conduct could reasonably be regarded as within 
the standard of care contemplated by the statute. However, in 
the present case, it is clear that the defendant was not within 
the standard of care contemplated by the statute. Had the de-
fendant been driving entirely within his own lane as required by 
statute, it is evident that the accident would not have happened. 
In addition, had the defendant yielded the right-of-way to the 
plaintiff as required by the statute, then the plaintiff would 
have successfully made the turn and the accident would have been 
avoided. 
It is clear that the defendant's violation of the statutes 
constituted negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, the 
Court committed prejudicial error in failing to so instruct the 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the total special damages proved far exceeded the 
amount of the general damage award, it is clear that the verdict 
was a result of prejudice or misunderstanding on the part of the 
jury and that the Court erred in failing to grant appellant's mo-
tion for a new trial. Appellant also submits that the facts viewed 
most favorably to the defendant show that he violated the stat-
utes and standard of care required of him and that he was negli-
gent as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court erred in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failing to instruct the jury accordingly. This Court should 
remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S .UREX ''LEWarS , ' for: 
HOWARD, .JiEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to David E. West, Attorney for Respondent, 1300 
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 19th day 
of March, 1976. 
S^-REX' I*EWIS 
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